The Ocean Dumping ConventionA Hopeful Beginning

TERRY L. LEITZELL'

I. INTRODUCTION
On December 29, 1972, the Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution By Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter in the
oceans was opened for signature in Washington, Moscow, London
and Mexico City.' Twenty-seven States signed the convention that
day, with indications that many others would do so in the near
future, thus bringing over two years of cooperative effort closer to
fulfillment. The achievement of an ocean dumping convention is
notable and hopefully even "a historic step toward the control of
global pollution," as stated by Russell E. Train, Chairman of the
Council on Environmental Quality, and the United States Rep* Terry L. Leitzell is a Foreign Service Officer and an Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Ocean Affairs, Department of State; member of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Seabed
Committee and the U.S. Delegation to the London Conference; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1967; A.B., Cornell University, 1964. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State or the United States Government.
1. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, signed at Oslo, Feb. 15, 1972 (adopted Nov. 13,
1972); 11 INT'L LEGAL MATmiAIs 1294 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Governtion].
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resentative at the Conference in London which negotiated the
convention.2 Although the convention deals with a pollution source
that accounts for only approximately ten percent of all ocean pollution, it is notable in that it was negotiated and agreed to during
a period of evolving attitudes on environmental matters, in which a
few states were strongly committed to solving pollution problems,
while many others maintained a relatively chauvenistic position.
Most of the states involved in the negotiations were strongly concerned as well with avoiding prejudices to their positions in the
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, now scheduled for a
two-week organizational session in November/December 1973 and
an eight-week substantive session in April/May 1974. 3 The com-

pletion of a convention to control marine dumping in this rather
unfavorable negotiating atmosphere is noteworthy, and perhaps

augurs well for the possibility of effective pollution controls (resulting) from the Law of the Sea Conference and the Conference
on Marine Pollution scheduled for October 1973.
II. HISTORY
In a message to Congress dated April 15, 1970, President Richard
M. Nixon stated that he was directing the Council on Environmental
Quality and several other federal agencies to undertake a complete
study of the problems and alternatives to ocean dumping, and to
"recommend further actions". 4 On February 8, 1971, the President
recommended domestic legislation which would ban unregulated
ocean dumping and establish an administrative structure to allow
dumping to take place only after the issuance of a permit by the
Environmental Protection Agency. 5 At the same time, he instructed the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Chairman
of the Council on Environmental Quality, to develop and pursue
international initiatives directed toward this same objective on a
global basis."
The United States thus tabled the first draft of a convention
on ocean dumping in June, 1971, at the first meeting of the Inter2. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1972, at 34.
3. G.A. Res. 3029 (XXVII) (1972).
4. CouNciL oN ENV O-NENTAL QuALITY, OcEAN DUmpiNG: A NATIONAL
PoLIcY, President'sMessage on Waste Disposal 43 (1970).
5. 1971 CouNcnL ON ENVIONMENTAL QuALITY ANN. REP., App. F.
6. Id.

governmental Working Group on Marine Pollution (IWGMP),
which was preparing for the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, to be held a year later in Stockholm.7 The
IWGMP considered a second draft at its November, 1971, meeting
in Ottawa.8 Since no further IWGMP sessions could be scheduled,
the Government of Iceland invited interested governments to meet
in Reykjavik in April, 1972, to further consider the draft convention.
Although the twenty-nine nations participating could not agree on
a complete text, draft articles were referred to the Stockholm Conference for further consideration and appropriate action. After
a short meeting in London in May, 1972, which attempted in vain
to resolve the outstanding differences, the Stockholm Conference
recommended that governments refer the draft articles to an intergovernmental conference to be convened by the United Kingdom
before November, 1972, with the purpose of completing a convention
and opening it for signature before the end of 1972.10 That recom-

mendation also referred the draft articles to the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed Beyond National

Jurisdiction (Seabed Committee) for information and comments
at its July/August, 1972 meeting, but there were only scattered comments, and no formal communication was sent to the later conference."
The United Kingdom convened the Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea on
October 30, 1972, with eighty participating countries, twelve observer nations and nine representatives of international organizations.112 The negotiations were completed on November 12, and the
resultant convention was opened for signature on December 29,
1972.
III.

STRUCTURE OF THE CONVENTION

The basic thrust of the Convention is to require the contracting
7. Working Paper, Ocean Dumping, U. N. Doc. A/Conf.48/PC/1WGMIP.
1/5 (1972).
8. Draft Report of the Second Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on Marine Pollution, Ottawa; U. N. Doc. A/Conf.48/1WGMP.11/5
(1971); 11 INT'L LEAL MATERIALS 19 (1972).
9. Report of the Intergovernmental Meeting on Ocean Dumping, Reyjavik; U. N. Doc. A/Conf.48/8/Add. 1 (1972).
10. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at
Stockholm, June 16, 1972; Recommendation 233.
11. Summary Records, Subcommittee III, U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed Beyond National Jurisdiction, U. N. Doc. A/AC.
138/SC.III/SR.20-31 (1972).
12. Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on
the Dumping of Wastes at Sea, 11 INT'L LEGAL MArnRAIs 1291 (1972).
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parties to prohibit all dumping of "wastes or other matter"' 3 in
the "sea."'14 The definition of "dumping" in Article III of the Convention includes any "deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other
matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures," as well as the disposal of such "vessel, aircraft, platform or
other man made structures" themselves. The Convention goes on
to exclude three categories of activities:
(1) disposal of wastes incidental to the normal operations of
vessels, aircraft, etc.15 These activities are exempted since they are
covered by other conventions such as the 1954 Convention on the
Pollution of the Seas by Oil.16 The Inter-Governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO), which administered the 1954
Convention, is presently in the final preparatory stages for the
1973 Conference on Marine Pollution which will hopefully produce
stricter standards to essentially eliminate the operational discharge
of oil from vessels.
(2) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere
disposal thereof.' 7 Various instruments and devices are often

placed on the seabed for purposes such as environmental monitoring.
Which may not be intended for recovery. It was considered necessary to specify that this type of "disposal" was not to be regulated
under the Convention.
(3) "disposal of wastes or other matter directly arising from,
or related to, the exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore
processing of sea-bed mineral resources."' 8 One of the major items
for negotiation in the Law of the Sea Conference is a regime for
activities relating to seabed minerals, and an integral part of that
regime will be an arrangement to provide comprehensive regulations governing pollution from seabed mineral resource activities.
Consequently, it was thought unnecessary, and a duplication of
effort, to deal with that problem in the dumping convention.
13. "Wastes or other matter" is defined in Article III of the Convention
as "material and substance of any kind, form or description".
14. "Sea" is defined in Article III of the Convention as "all marine waters
other than the internal waters of States".
15. Convention, Art. II, para. 1(b) (i).
16. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil, opened for signatures May 12, 1954; [1958] 12 U.S.T. 2989; T.I.A.S.
No. 4900; 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
17. Convention, Art. III, para. 1(b) (ii).
18. Id. art. III, para. 1 (c).

Article VII (4) also states that the Convention shall not apply
to those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under
international law. However, the Article goes on to state that "each
Party shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures that
such vessels and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a manner
consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention . ..

."

During the earlier negotiations in Reykjavik and London there
had been a split of opinion on this question, with some delegations
favoring the approach of not applying the Convention to such
vessels and aircraft, and others wanting to adopt a sovereign
immunity concept. The draft articles resulting from the Reykjavik
meeting included both approaches. 1 9 The sovereign immunity approach would mean that the terms of the Convention would have
applied to all vessels, but that vessels entitled to sovereign immunity
would not be subject to enforcement action by other than their
flag State (except, of course, that they could be expelled from the
territorial sea of a foreign State under other concepts of international law). In the final negotiations it was decided to exempt such
vessels from the terms of the Convention, as had been done in the
1954 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil.20
Although equally difficult in formulation, the substance of
the regulatory provisions appears relatively straightforward in
final form. While Article IV is written in terms of prohibiting
dumping, it in fact prohibits the dumping of only a select group of
substances, while requiring either a "special" or "general" permit
for the dumping of all other substances. After an introductory
statement, Article IV says:
"(a) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex I
is prohibited; 21
(b) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex II
22
requires a prior special permit;

(c) the dumping of all other wastes or matter requires a prior
general permit."
19. Summary Records, Supra note 11, at art. IX.
20. Id. art. II.
21. Annex I of the Convention lists organohalogen compounds, mercury
and mercury compounds, cadmium and cadmium compounds, persistent
plastics and other persistent synthetics, various petroleum substances, highlevel radioactive wastes, and materials produced for biological and chemical warfare.
22. Annex 11 of the Convention lists "significant amounts" of arsenic,
lead, copper, zinc, organohalogen compounds, cyanides, fluorides and pesticides and their by-products not covered in Annex I; acids and alkalis containing any of the preceding substances or beryllium, chromium, nickel,
vanadium and their compounds; scrap metal and bulky wastes; and, radioactive wastes not covered by Annex L
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The basic difference between the two types of permits is that

"special permit" means a specific permission for a certain dumping

or series of dumpings, while a "general permit" means a permission
granted for dumping certain materials over a period of time under
less specific conditions than would be required for an Annex II
substance.

23

Having laid out the application of a permit system in Article IV,
the Convention then requires, in Article VI, that each contracting
party establish an appropriate authority or authorities to issue the
required permits, keep records of the nature and quantity of all
matter permitted to be dumped, and to monitor, either individually
or in cooperation with other Parties or organizations, the condition

of the seas. 24 The authority is required to issue permits to all
vessels and aircraft loading matter in its territory for dumping,
and to all flag vessels and aircraft loading matter in the territory
25
of a non-Party State.

The regulatory structure of the Convention illustrates the
recognition by the countries involved in the negotiation that, to
be acceptable, the result of the Conference must depend heavily on
national administrators. The negotiations at Oslo in late 1971 and
early 1972, which resulted in the first convention dealing with
ocean dumping,2 6 produced structure almost identical to that
later negotiated in London. There is a general requirement in
Article 7 of that Convention of obtaining approval before any
dumping takes place; a requirement in Article 6 for special permits
for the dumping of certain substances; and a prohibition in Article
5 on the dumping of substances listed in an Annex. With the exception of the listing of certain substances in two annexes, the Oslo
Convention depends generally on national administrations to carry
out the terms of the Convention. It seems likely that the nations
taking part in the Oslo and London negotiations fully understood
that it would not be possible to provide a major role in either convention for an international organization, but that the conventions
23. Convention, art. III, para. 5, 6.

24. Id. art. IV, para. 1(a), (b), (c), and (d).
25. Id. art. VI, para. 2.

26. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from
Ships and Aircraft, done at Oslo, Feb. 15, 1972; 11 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS
262 (1972).

would be necessarily dependent on agencies and authorities set up
domestically by each contracting party.
The regulatory structure is almost entirely compatible with
the domestic legislation enacted by the United States in October,
1972,27 (a few minor amendments will be proposed in the near
future). That legislation provides that no person shall transport
any material from the United States for the purpose of dumping
unless a permit has been issued by the Environmental Protection
Agency, 28 or, in the case of dredged materials, by the Army Corps
of Engineers. 29 The U.S. domestic legislation has no annexes analagous to those in the Convention, although it does specifically prohibit the dumping of radiological, chemical and biological warfare
agents and high-level radioactive wastes. 80 However, the United
States can carry out its international obligations to prohibit the

dumping of Annex I substances, and to give special attention to
Annex II substances, through the power of the domestic administrator. He may, under the domestic legislation, establish a system of
special permits for Annex II materials3 1 and, under his general
authority to issue regulations,32 may simply prohibit the issuance of
permits for Annex I substances (and any other substance). If the
Convention is amended in the future to add to Annexes I and II,
the domestic administrator could, of course, utilize this same authority to bring U.S. domestic practice into conformity.
IV.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEmENTS

When the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment
concluded in June, 1972, without establishing any new international
organization to deal directly with environmental problems, it was
hoped that the negotiation of the ocean dumping convention might
provide either a new organization or, at least, some guidance as
to which existing organization was willing and able to assume new
responsibility. (The Stockholm Conference and the United Nations
General Assembly did, of course, create a new secretariat unit to
coordinate international actions concerning the environment).
However, the Conference on ocean dumping avoided what was assumed to be an extremely contentious issue, due to a desire to conclude the convention. Thus, Article XIV of the Convention pro27. Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L.

No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972).
28. Id. §§ 101-02.
29. Id. §§ 101, 103.
30. Id. § 101.
31. Id. § 102.
32. Id. § 108.
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vides that the depositary government, the United Kingdom, shall
convene a meeting of the Contracting Parties within three months
after the entry into force of the Convention (the Convention comes
into force on the thirtieth day following the deposit of the fifteenth
ratification.33 At that meeting, the Parties are required to designate
a competent organization existing at the time of that meeting to be
responsible for secretariat duties under the Convention. 34 Thus,
while there was agreement not to create a new organization, the
choices were expanded to include the possibility of designating an
organization which could come into existance between the end of
the negotiations and the entry into force of the Convention. (The
difficult question of dispute settlement procedures was also postponed until the first consultative meeting of the Parties)."
More importantly, however, it was decided to give the organization only relatively routine administrative functions, and to reserve
the more substantive items for regular consultative meetings of
the Parties. The consultative meetings, to be held at least every
two years, would review and adopt amendments, receive and consider reports from Parties, and cooperate and collaborate with
scientific bodies and regional organizations.3 6 Both the designated
organization and the consultative meetings would consider the
question of required consultations on the disposal of Annex I
materials under emergency circumstances (the Convention allows
dumping of Annex I substances in very limited emergency circumstances after consultations with the designated organization
and the other Parties as appropriate) .37
V.

JUMSDICTION

The most conentious issues of the negotiations involved jurisdiction and enforcement of the standards set out in the Convention,
issues which threatened to break up the London Conference without agreement. The controversy in London was presaged by
events during the Reykjavik meeting. It was generally agreed by
all countries that the flag State should be required to enforce the
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Convention, art. XIX.
Id. art. XIV.
Id. art. XI.
Id. art. XIV.
Id. arts. IV, XIV.

Convention against all vessels and aircraft registered in its territory,
and that each State should be required to apply measures to all
vessels and aircraft of any flag loading matter in its territory to
be dumped.3 8 The problem arose in trying to decide the extent
of jurisdiction, under the convention, which a coastal state could
exercise over aircraft and vessels off its shores. It was argued by
many countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States
and some Scandanavian countries, that the formulation of the Oslo
Convention should be used since it stated the present maximum
jurisdiction recognized by international law-that is, complete enforcement rights for the coastal State in its territoral sea.80 (This
does not really state the maximum, of course, since the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone allows jurisdiction
to a maximum of 12 miles over activities such as dumping to the
extent that the territorial sea itself is affected. 40 Also, the U.S.
domestic legislation applies both to the three-mile territorial sea
and to the nine-mile contiguous zone. 41) It can be argued that
this would not provide consistent application since there is a dispute
over the breadth of the territorial sea. However, the United States
and others favored this approach since there is no dispute over the
rights of a State within its territorial sea; and the question of its
outer boundary will hopefully be settled at the 1973 Law of the
Sea Conference.
Several countries argued at Reykjavik that to limit this Convention to the territorial sea was overly conservative, and that it
would be best to allow for the possibility of special coastal State
jurisdiction for pollution control beyond the territorial sea, whether
unilaterally claimed or internationally agreed. The result was
vague language in the third part of the article on jurisdiction,
which said that each Party shall apply the Convention to all
(iii) vessels and aircraft and fixed or floating platforms under
its jurisdiction believed to be engaged in dumping." This set the
stage for the confrontation in London seven months later.
The negotiation of the article on jurisdiction at the London
Conference consumed several days of discussion in working groups
of various sizes, in corridors, over tea, and in the plenary session.
The question was entirely one of differing positions on law of
38. Draft Convention, supra.note 9, art. IX.
39. Ship and Aircraft Dumping Convention, supra note 26, art. XV.
40. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at
Geneva, April 29, 1958; [,1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205.
41. Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.

92-532, 86 Stat. 1052, § 101.
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the sea matters, and was certainly not nearly as important in the
context of controlling dumping as the time and difficulty of negotiation would indicate. In fact, most countries agree that the real
force of the Convention is in controlling vessels and aircraft in
the ports of Contracting Parties when they are loading materials
for dumping.42 But issues of principle are always more difficult
to negotiate than those of practical application.
The range of alternatives was broad, ranging from application
to the territorial sea to the establishment of a wide coastal State
pollution control zone. The two opposing groups were, first, those
nations favoring a narrow territorial sea with coastal pollution
controls in the area beyond limited to emergency circumstances,
such as those utilized in the 1969 Convention on intervention; 43 and,
second, those States desiring coastal State controls in broad areas
such as the Canadian Arctic Pollution Control Zone. 4 While all

participating nations agreed that these were issues within the
competence of the Law of the Sea Conference, there was vigorous
disagreement as to the best method for settling the issue while
preserving the positions of all nations.
The proposal for a pollution control zone was, in reality, only
a negotiating threat and was quickly withdrawn. The group
favoring broad coastal controls argued that the insertion of "territorial seas" prejudiced their position that coastal States had broader
rights. While they did not directly argue that present international
law recognized their position, they did state that law in favor of
coastal rights was emerging, and that failure to include such rights
here would effectively halt that trend. When it was proposed, as
an intended compromise, to simply eliminate the third basis of
jurisdiction in the Convention, the same group responded that such
action would be even more detrimental to their postion and was
equally unacceptable.
Finally, the Conference returned to the Reykjavik language
and began to negotiate possible changes to it. The broad rights
42. Convention, art. VII, para. 1 (b).
43. The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, signed at Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969;

(Not yet in force) 9 INTL.

LEGAL MATER:AIs

25 (1970), Cnmd. 4403.

44. An Act to Prevent Pollution of Areas of the Arctic Waters Adjacent
to the Mainland and Islands of the Canadian Arctic, C-202 (1970).

group proposed adding two words, so that the language would
read "vessels and aircraft and fixed or floating platforms in areas
under its jurisdiction . . ." (emphasis added).

This was objected

to, however, as indicated too strongly zones of pollution control, or
control in the waters above the continental shelf.
Finally, since the remaining articles had been essentially
agreed to and since everyone was anxious to complete an effective
Convention, it was decided to retain the Reykjavik language without change, and add a new Article XIII, which was a saving clause
to protect the law of the sea positions of all Parties. Article XIII
reads as follows:
"Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the codification and
development of the law of the sea by the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea convened pursuant to Resolution 2750C
(XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations nor the
present or future claims and legal views of any State concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag
State jurisdiction. The Contracting Parties agree to consult at a
meeting to be convened by the Organization after the Law of the
Sea Conference, and in any case not later than 1976, with a view
to defining the nature and extent of the right and the responsibility
of a coastal State to apply the Convention in a zone adjacent to
its coast."
While the first sentence is important in protecting positions and
in making the Convention acceptable to countries with widely
differing views on the law of the sea, the second sentence is worthy
of note as well, since it again indicates the intent of the negotiating
nations to reach compromises now, while providing the ability to
eliminate the vagueness that made compromise possible.
VI. AmENDAvNT PRocDUR s
The procedures for amending the body of the Convention are
relatively standard, requiring approval first by two-thirds of the
countries present at a consultative meeting, followed by formal
acceptance by two-thirds of the Parties. Amendments come into
force only for those Parties accepting them. 45 However, amendments to the Annexes can be made more easily. Amendments to
the Annexes, which are to be based on scientific or technical considerations, may be approved by two-thirds of those countries
present at a consultative meeting. They then enter into force for
each Party immediately upon formal notification to the organization of its acceptance, and for all Parties within 100 days of approval at the meeting, except for those Parties making a declaration
within the 100 days that they could not accept the amendment.
45. Convention, art. XV, para. 1(a).
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Some countries favored an easier procedure which would have
required only approval at a consultative meeting, but it was felt

that the procedure adopted would be useful, in that it requires a
positive act of refusal, theoretically made more difficult by publicity and peer pressure to accept the proposed amendment.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Convention was critized by many, both during and after
its negotiation, on the grounds that it did not fulfill the hopes and
desires of those who feel that new international organizations are
necessary if global environmental problems are to be solved, and
if proper scientific input is to be available. Although that point of
view is understandable, and many agree that greatly increased international cooperation is needed in the environmental area, it is
the will of nations to solve the problems that is the key to the
matter. Conventions and organizations are worth only what nations make them worth, and the best legal draftsmanship available
cannot change the political structure of the international community. But the negotiation of an ocean dumping convention does
provide hope, since the countries involved overcame a wide divergence of opinion on issues such as jurisdiction of coastal States, and
the structure of the organization. In addition, the Parties assumed
general obligations to promote the control of all sources of pollution, and to take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of
the sea by dumping.4 6 The history of the negotiation and the structure of the Convention clearly represent the strength of the will of
the nations concerned, and provide the hope that this will indeed

be the first step in a series of conventions and arrangements to
protect the marine environment.

46. Id. art. L

